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To fill a vacancy occurring several years ago, and heretofore unfilled,
the school faculty has received an addition this fall in the person of
Crawford Morrison Bishop, B. A., Dartmouth, 1906, LL.B., Mary-
land, 1909; M.A., Columbia, 1917 Before coming to the University
of Washington, Mr. Bishop served in the diplomatic and consular
service in China, engaged in the private practice of law in New York
City, specializing in international law, served at different times in
various governmental departments at Washington, D. C., and recently
was attorney with the United States Agency of the Mixed Claims
Commission, United States and Mexico, Washington, D. C.
NO-PAR STOCK AND ITS EFFECT ON WASHINGTON LAw-In 1912
the New York Legislature passed the first statute authorizing the
organization of corporations in New York with stock of no-par value.'
Such stock is defined by Cook as "stock which does not state how
much money it represents."2 Immediately upon the passage of the law
in New York a furor arose in the law reviews of the country, either
2 N. Y. Laws 1912, ch. 351.
2Cooic ow CoapoAm~oxrs, 8 ed.
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in criticism of, or in defense of, the innovation in the field of corpora-
tion finance.3
That this subject is becoming a popular field of corporate legislation
is beyond denial for at the present time thirty-nine states, including
Washington 4 allow corporations to issue such stock;5 and the common
stock issues are becoming increasingly popular.6
The fact that the statutory provisions of the various states differ
widely produces a wide variety of problems. Any attempt to sum-
marize them is too great a task to be accomplished now, although a
scholarly attempt has been made.7  Under such circumstances one can-
not draw conclusions that one may safely apply to all states. The field
of no-par stock is one sorely in need of uniform legislation, so that
the enactment of restrictive provisions in one state will not result in
a flight of its corporations to another state.
At the present writing (October, 1926), in only two states has the
question of constitutionality been raised, if cases involving the taxation
of no-par stock be excepted." In Alabama, in the case of Randle v.
Winona Coal Co.9 the Court held that "permitting shares of stock to
be changed from a stated to a no-par value does not violate a constitu-
tional provision", and that stock shall be issued only for money, labor
done, or property actually received. Washington has provisions similar
to those of Alabama in its constitution.1"
There are two cases in California dealing with the constitutionality
of the no-par stock statute there.1 In the case of Del Monte Light and
Power Co. v. Jordan12 the power company organized a corporation
with an authorized capital of $25,000, consisting of 125 shares of
I The articles of Mr. Cook appearing in the AMEIaiCAN BAR AssocrA.voN
JouaRxA for October (1991) denounce the system "as a dangerous method of
defrauding both the public and creditors," saying, "The whole theory of no-par
stock is let the buyer beware and let the creditor beware." Subsequent con-
tributors to the JounaiTA remark that Mr. Cook's views are not well taken but
that a no-par stock corporation does not tend to defraud anyone. A share of
no-par stock is mere evidence of an aliquot or divisional interest in the assets or
earnings of the corporation issuing the same. No representation is made by the
stock as to its value. Creditors are put on notice as to the true value of the
shares of stock issued, purchasers are not misled by a gold engraved certificate
stamped in large letters, "Par Value One Hundred Dollars." J. C. Bonright,
in the COLudBIA LAW REVIEw, and William Cook in his recent book lead the
opposition, while Thompson, Elihu Root, Dewing, Wickersham and the courts
generally have favored the idea as a step forward in corporation finance.
'Rem. Comp. Stat. § 3805 as amended by Session Laws of 1925, ch. 87, page
112; P C. § 4505.
A complete list of the statutes of each state is given in 25 COL. L. REv. 44.
"In a recent issue of the FINANrCIAL CHaoNIcL, 85% of the common stock
issues advertised in the field of industrial and public utility corporations were
issues of no-par stock.
125 COL. L. REv. 43.
8 For discussion of the question of taxation under the No-Par Stock stat-
utes, see 39 HAav. L. REv. .989.
'9206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 790 (1921).
" See Constitution of Washington, Art. XII, § 6.
" Cal. Civil Code, beginning with § -0906.
"270 Cal. Dec. 115, 238 Pac. 710 (1925).
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preferred stock and 125 shares of common stock, both of which were
to have a par value of $100, and 250 shares of common stock of no-par
value. The Supreme Court sustained the refusal of the Secretary of
State to grant the corporation a charter on the ground that it violated
the constitution of California. The Court affirmed the principles laid
down in Film Producers v. Jordan,18 which held that every share of
stock in a California corporation must be of a single par value. The
constitution of the state was interpreted to mean that there should be
a proportionality of voting power to liability, and therefore a corpora-
tion composed of no-par stock of one value, and par stock of another
(both of which have the same voting power), is a violation of the
constitutional provision. 4 In Land Development Co. v. Jordan,15 it
is held that the constitutional provision is complied with "'when each
share of the corporation represents the same interest as every other
share and there is a unity of liability as between all the shares." Hence,
a corporation with mixed stock is not constitutionally organized. How-
ever, in the case of Commonwealth Acceptance Corporation v. Jordan,:6
the Court held that a foreign corporation, even though it had a stock
structure consisting of par and no-par stock may do business m
California.
The authpnty for local corporations to issue mixed par and no-par
stock is denied in Nevada,' 7 as it is in California,'" but is allowed in
Illinois.'0
To change from par to no-par stock is allowed in Alabama20 , Dela-
ware,2 ' Massachusetts, 2 2 and New Jersey,' the decisions in each case
depending on the wording of statutory and constitutional provisions.
3171 Cal. 664, 154 Pac. 605 (1916).
"Legal writers have questioned the wisdom of this decision, one author
stating, "It seems to be reading an artificial and most gratuitous limitation into
a constitution which is already a legal anachronism on the subject of corpora-
tions" (13 CAL. L. REv. 483). This decision, which disrupted many corporations
in California organized under an unconstitutional act, was limited to corpora-
tions capitalized with both par and no-par stock. To determine the effect of
this decision, the Secretary of State, Jordan, took a test case to the Supreme
Court of California.
"s 71 Cal. Dec. 349, 945 Pac. 187 (March, 1926).
15 946 Pac. (Cal.) 796 (May, 1926). The Court held that Art. XII, § 15
of the State Constitution had no application. The Section reads: "No corpora-
tion organized outside the limits of this state shall be allowed to transact busi-
ness within this state on more favorable conditions than are prescribed by law
to similar corporations organized under the laws of this State.'
Accord-North American Petroleum Co. v. Hopkins, 105 Kan. 161, 181 Pac.
695 (1919), Standard etc. Co. v. Sullivan, 982 Mo. 961, 921 S. W 798 (1920).
"S State ex rel. Goodman v. Greathouse, 47 Nev. 197, 917 Pac. 957 (1993).
"See note 13, supra.
"Roberts and Schaefer Co. v. Rsnmerson, 313 Ill. 137, 144 N. E. 818 (1994).
Winona Coal Co. v. Randle, note 9, eupra.
"Peters v. United States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 At. 598 (1991).
'Hood Rubber Co. v. Commonwealth, 938 Mass. 369, 131 N. E. 901 (1991),
Olymptc Theatres v. Commonwealth, 938 Mass. 374, 131 N. E. 904 (1991).
"Grausman v. Porto Rican Tobacco Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 155, 191 AUt. 895
(1993).
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There is little or no difference between the rules governing subscrip-
tion agreements to par and no-par stock. The fundamental principles
are the same.24 Hence, where one makes payments under a contract
to buy shares of certain par value,'he may recover back money already
paid upon such a contract where it appears that the corporation has
changed its financial organization and now tenders shares of no-par
value.25 The subscriber has lost the protection afforded by the par
value statute,26 and when no-par stock was sold to one group of stock-
holders at a higher price than to others, the former could recover the
difference between the market value of the shares, and the price paid
for them.2 7
Every member of a par stock corporation has a right to demand that
all subsequent sales of stock resulting in increased capitalization be
at par. A sale below par would, of course, reduce his interest pro-
portionately The question arises, may a shareholder set aside or
object to the sale of no-par stock below its market value? To answer
this question, it must be first remembered that in general, two types
of no par stock statutes exist: first, the "Stated No Par Stock" statutes,
modeled after New York's, and secondly the "True No-Par Stock"
statutes, modeled after Delaware's. The former requires a statement
of the value of the no-par stock to be placed on the stock certificate, 2s
and the latter merely requires a statement of the number of shares
issued.2 9 (The Washington statute requires the incorporators to certify
that a certain amount of capital has been paid in.)"0
In cases involving Stated No-Par Stock statutes, the holders of stock
already issued have a right to demand that the new issue be sold for
at least the capital payment set forth in the certificate of incorpora-
tion.2 1 In fact New York requires that not only shall the stated value
be paid in for shares already issued, but that the same stated value will
be paid in against all the shares hereafter issued. 32  It would seem,
therefore, that under this type of statute that a shareholder may set
aside the sale of stock sold for less than the value stated in the articles
of incorporation or under the fair valuation placed on the stock by
those empowered to evaluate it. It would seem however, that the
financial exigencies of the concern and the good faith of the purchasers
are elements to be considered by the court in upholding the validity ot
the sale.
I Smith v. The General Motors Co, 289 Fed. 205 (19,03). The Court said. p.
-07, "A subscription to original stock at a definite par value and a subscrip-
tion to an issue of increased no-par value stock at a fixed and definite price
seem to depend upon the same principles."
I Paul v. Pacific Development Co., 197 N. Y. S. 811 (1922).
1 37 HARV. L. REv. 467.
'Hodgman v. Atl. Reflning Co., 300 Fed. 590 (1924).
1 N. Y. Corporation Laws, § 12b.
Laws of Del., 1925, Ch. 112, 1918a, § 4a.
20 Rem. Comp. Stat. § 3805, amended Sess. L., 1925, Ch. 87, p. 112; P C.§ 4So5.
1125 Col. L. Rev. 56.
N. Y. Corporation Laws, § 12a.
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A more difficult question is raised by the True No-Par Stock statutes.
One of the main reasons for the adoption of the no-par stock as a
system of corporate finance was to make legal a means of selling stock
below par without entering into the old fiction of first issuing the
stock to some person who immediately proceeded to turn the same back
to the corporation, whereupon it would be sold at any price. The
theory was that the stock had been fully paid for by someone.33 Most
statutes of this class provid6, with Washington34 " the liability
of a subscriber to no-par stock shall be such as shall be, or shall have
been, mutually agreed upon between the corporation and the sub-
scribers." It is at least doubtful whether the corporation can contract
to give its stock away. Some consideration must pass.35  And it
would seem that the shareholder has an absolute right to go into
equity and demand that the courts intervene on behalf of those whose
assets are being endangered. The precise point has not yet been raised
however.3 6
In the Johnson case, supra, the Court says, on page 862 of its opinion,
"the general, if not universally accepted theory of the purpose of such
(no-par stock) statutes is that they are intended to do away with both
the 'trust fund' and the 'holding out' doctrines." This dicta is of par-
ticular interest to *Washington because the "trust fund" theory is
recognized here.3 So far as the stated value of no-par stock statutes
are concerned the "trust fund" or "holding out" doctrines must still
apply. If a corporation, organized under one of these statutes, repre-
sents that each share of stock has a value of five dollars, and creditors
rely upon that representation, there would seem to be a "holding out"
as much as there would have been under the old system.
In Washington, the "trust fund" theory is that all the assets of an
insolvent corporation are a trust fund for the benefit of all the creditors
and no creditor can secure a preference over others. The unpaid sub-
scription to true no-par stock of a corporation would seem to be an
asset within the meaning of the theory.38 And since it has been held
an asset with reference to stock of par value,39 the mere fact that the
stock has no par value would seem to be an inadequate reason for hold-
ing otherwise. It is submitted that Washington will hold the subscriber
liable to the creditors for the balance of the subscription price of his
See Connor v. Robinson, 137 Wash. 672, 243 Pac. 849, 246 Pac. 758 (1926).
r Rem. 'Comp. Stat. § 3805, Amended 1925 Sess. L., Ch. 87, p. 112; P. C.§ 4505.
Stone v. Young, 210 App. Div. 303, 206 N. Y. S. 95 (1924).
' See 25 Cor.. L. Rxv. 43; Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining Co., note 27, s8upra;
Johnson v. Louisville Trust Co., 293 Fed. 857 (1923).
2' See 1 WAsiE. L. Ray. 81, "The Trust Fund Theory."
3Melville v. Rhodes, 136 Wash. 920, 239 Pac. 560 (1925) (stock had par
value), see also 39 HAnv. L. Rav. 757, "Liability of Stockholders Taking Stock
at a Discount to Pay Par Value Thereof."
" See note 38, supra.
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stock, especially in view of Rem. Comp. Stat., § 3805, as amended 1925
Sess. L. Ch. 87, P C., §4505.40
Washington, contrary to the weight of authority, has adopted the
rule that when the board of directors of a corporation pay for property
bought with shares of stock, the legality of such act can be attacked
by the creditors if the true value of the property was less than the value
of the stock.41  The majority rule upholds the legality of the act,
if the directors acted in good faith and the subscriber was bona fide.
Under the Washington no-par stock statute, since it makes no difference
to the creditor whether the property paid for in stock is represented by
100 or 1,000 shares, the creditor could not attack the legality of the act
although the existing shareholders might. The recent case of Connor
v. Robinson4 2 lends color to the view that the "true value" theory is
doomed, and that the "good faith" theory will be adopted.
Although there are no decisions on this question, the writer ventures
the opinion as to the effect of this innovation upon the corporation law
of this state, that: 1. The "trust fund" theory will stand in cases where
there is a definite subscription for a definite sum-there remaining a
balance unpaid on the subscription. 2. The "true value" rule will
give way to the "good faith" rule, and where property is transferred
for no-par value shares, relief will be granted creditors only in cases of
actual fraud on the part of the directors in evaluating the property
Jeffrey Heiman.
JURISDICTION OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE-The judgment of a court
ot record and of general jurisdiction, acting within the scope of its
jurisdiction, is presumed to be valid in all particulars unless the con-
trary affirmatively appears on the face of the record.' But even such
a judgment is subject to attack on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.2
The judgment of a court of limited jurisdiction and not of record
enjoys no such presumption, and the jurisdiction of such a court must
be affirmatively shown.' In this state, a justice court is not, and can-
not be made, a court of record, 4 and its jurisdiction is limited both as
to subject matter5 and as to territory 6 Yet in a recent case' the
Supreme Court upheld, against a direct attack, the validity of a default
" "After the 'initial no-par capital' shall have been paid up, the liability
of a subscriber to no-par value stock shall be such as shall be, or shall have
been mutually agreed upon between the corporation and the subscriber of the
stock."
"Lantz v. Moeller 76 Wash. 429, 136 Pac. 687 (1913).
"Connor v. Robinson, note 33, supra.
'Ritchte v. Carpenter 2 Wash. 512, 28 Pac. 380 (1891).2Kline Bros. k Co. v. North Coast Fire Ins. Co., 80 Wash 609, 142 Pac. 7
(1914).
'Grzgnon v. Astor 2 How. (U. S.) 319, 11 L. ed. 283 (1844).
4 Const. Art. IV, § 11.
Const., Art. IV, § 10; Rem. Comp. St., §§44-45; P C., §§ 9564-65.
6 Rem. Comp. Stat., § 47 P C., § 9458; further restricted as to civil cases
by Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 1756-7, P C. §§ 9559-60.
'Nichols v. National Association of Creditors, Inc., 137 Wash. 74, 241 Pac.
960 (1925).
